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INVOKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
NAVIGATING TICKLISH POLITICAL WATERS
Louis Fisher*
In this Article, Louis Fisher acknowledges the constitutional legitimacy of
executive privilege, but he argues that legal and political limits render the scope of
the privilege narrower than what is commonly believed In support ofhis argument,
he points to early precedents set during the Washington Administration and to
congressional leverage over the executive branch. Though he recognizes the
executive branch's interest in ensuring that information is disclosed through
authorized channels and its concern about disclosures of information that may
embarrass the administration or one of its agency's, he asserts that there is no legal
or constitutionaIjustification for concealing such information. Dr. Fisher further
argues that Congress' need for information to govern supports an investigatory
power that trumps the executive branch's claim to exclusive control of information
in national security and foreign affairs cases.
INTRODUCTION
Presidents and scholars identify a variety of constitutional principles and
practices to justify executive privilege. There is no doubt that there are reasonable
grounds for withholding documents from Congress and for prohibiting some
executive officials from testifying before congressional committees. Just as there are
sound reasons for executive privilege, however, there are also legal and political
limits. Impressive claims for executive privilege can be offset by persuasive
arguments that Congress needs access to information to fulfill its constitutional
mandates. In many cases, the politics of the moment or practical considerations
override legal principles. Efforts to discover enduring and enforceable norms in this
area invariably fall short.
This Article examines some of the misconceptions about the extent of executive
privilege. Part I reviews the precedent established during the Washington
Administration for withholding documents from Congress. Close examination reveals
that the scope of presidential authority has been greatly exaggerated. Congress had
access to more documentation than is commonly believed and could have had more
* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress. B.S., 1956, College of William and Mary; Ph.D., 1967, the New
School for Social Research. The author appreciates valuable comments on this article by
Harold Relyea, Mort Rosenberg, and Mark Rozell.
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if it had demanded it. Part II focuses on congressional leverage. The power to
impeach, to hold executive officials in contempt, and to block nominations may force
executive officials to release documents that they otherwise would want to keep
private and confidential. Even if a President announces perfectly plausible grounds
for the withholding of documents, he may be forced to surrender to the will of
Congress to achieve more important goals. Part III examines the overly general-and
generous-claim that executive privilege has especially strong, if not unreviewable,
authority in the fields of foreign affairs, diplomacy, and national security.
I. IDENTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES:
EARLY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Constitution makes no specific reference to an executive power allowing the
President to withhold documents from Congress, nor does it specifically recognize a
need on the part of Congress for information from the Executive in order to legislate.
It is now routine, however, to consider both powers implied in the operation of the
executive and legislative branches. Long before the Supreme Court acknowledged
that fact,' the political branches already had reached a rough understanding and
worked out accommodations. When these two implied powers collide, one wonders
which should prevail. No magic formula yields a ready and reliable answer, for too
much depends on individual circumstances and political requirements.
A. Robert Morris Inquiry
During the First Congress, the House of Representatives debated a request from
Robert Morris to investigate his conduct as Superintendent of Finance.2 The matter
was referred to a select committee consisting of James Madison, Theodore Sedgwick,
and Roger Sherman.3 The House learned a day later that the Senate had passed a
resolution empowering President George Washington to appoint three commissioners
to inquire into the receipts and expenditures of public moneys during Morris'
administration.4
The select committee of Madison, Sedgwick, and Sherman issued a report,
recommending that a five-member committee be appointed to examine Morris'
' See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (holding that, to the
extent that the President's interest in withholding information for the purpose of
confidentiality "relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is
constitutionally based"); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) ("A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions whichthe legislation is intended to affect or change.").
2 See I ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
3 See id. at 1164.
4 See id. at 1191.
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performance in office. John Lawrence [Laurance] and William Smith were added to
the three already in place.' Elbridge Gerry objected on grounds that the House was
pretending it still had the power of the Continental Congress, which possessed both
legislative and executive powers. He said that the President was
the only competent authority to take cognizance of the conduct of officers
in the Executive Department; if we pursue the proposed plan of
appointing committees, we destroy the responsibility of Executive officers,
and divest the House of a great and essential privilege, that of impeaching
our Executive officers for mal-administration. 6
Gerry favored the Senate's approach of appointing three commissioners to do the
job.7 Theodorick Bland opposed the appointment of commissioners "as creating an
unnecessary expense."' Madison supported the five-man committee, arguing "that
the House should possess itself of the fullest information in order to doing justice to
the country and to public officers."9 The committee was appointed and issued a
report on February 16, 1791.10
The committee investigation did not produce a direct collision between Congress
and the Washington Administration because the area of inquiry concerned activities
that occurred during the previous Continental Congress. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that Congress debated which branch of government-legislative or
executive-was the proper party for investigating executive matters." The House
decided, as Madison noted, that it was necessary for Congress to acquire the
necessary information in orderto "do justice" to the country and to public officers. 2
B. Major General Arthur St. Clair Investigation
Two years later, on March 27, 1792, the House appointed a committee to inquire
into the heavy military losses suffered by the troops of Major General Arthur St.
Clair to Indian tribes.' 3 Out of 1400 troops, 657 were killed and another 271
wounded.14 The House committee was empowered "to call for such persons, papers,
See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1464 (1790).
6 Id. (statement of Rep. Elbridge Gerry).
7 See id. at 1464-65.
' Id. at 1465 (statement of Rep. Theodorick Bland).
9 Id. (statement of Rep. James Madison).'
10 See id. at 1964.
See id at 1465.
,2 See id
13 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792).
14 See George C. Chalou, St. Clair's Defeat, 1792, in I CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, A
DOCUMENTED HISTORY, 1792-1974, at 7 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds.,
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and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries." 5 William Giles, regarding
the inquiry as "indispensable" and "strictly proper," concluded that the House is "the
proper source, as the immediate guardians of the public interest."' 6 Similar to the
inquiry of Morris, some representatives thought the investigation should be conducted
by President Washington.17 A motion to that effect was rejected 21 to 3 5, after which
the House inquiry was supported 44 to 10. "
According to the account of Thomas Jefferson, President Washington convened
his Cabinet to consider the extent to which the House could call for papers and
persons. Jefferson reported that the Cabinet considered and agreed:
first, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute
inquiries. Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the
Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the
public: consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither
the committee nor House had a right to call on the Head of a Department,
who and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the
committee should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the
President.'
According to Jefferson, the Cabinet concluded that "there was not a paper which
might not be properly produced."2° President Washington instructed Secretary of
War Henry Knox to "lay before the House of Representatives such papers from your
Department, as are requested by the enclosed Resolution."'" Washington also thought
it appropriate for St. C lair, who had expressed an interest in retiring, to make himself
fully available to the House: "I should hope an opportunity would thereby be
afforded you, of explaining your conduct, in a manner satisfactory to the public and
yourself."22 The House committee examined papers furnished by the executive
branch, listened to explanations from department heads and other witnesses, and
received a written statement from General St. Clair.23 The general principle of
1975).
'" 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792).
16 Id. at 490.
17 See id at491-92.
11 See id. at 493.
19 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 304 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., Library ed. 1904).
20 Id. at 305.
2' Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of War (Apr. 4, 1792), in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 15 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
22 Id. at 16.
23 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. at app. 1052-59, 1106-13, 1310-17.
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executive privilege had been established because the President could refuse papers
"the disclosure of which would injure the public." 4 The language here is significant.
The President was concerned about injury to the public, not to himself or his
associates. Presidents were not entitled to withhold information simply because it
might embarrass the administration or reveal improper or illegal activities.
C. Diplomatic Correspondence with France
In 1794, the Senate adopted a resolution requesting President Washington to
submit certain diplomatic correspondence concerning U.S. policy with France.2" At
a Cabinet meeting, he received advice from Secretary of War Henry Knox that "no
part of the correspondences should be sent to the Senate." '26 Secretary of Treasury
Alexander Hamilton agreed with Knox, adding that "the principle is safe, by
excepting such parts as the President may choose to withhold."" Attorney General
Edmund Randolph, who would soon become Secretary of State, said that "all the
correspondence proper, from its nature, to be communicated to the Senate, should be
sent; but that what the President thinks improper, should not be sent."2" William
Bradford, replacing Randolph as Attorney General, was of the opinion that "it is the
duty of the Executive to withhold such parts of the said correspondence as in the
judgment of the Executive shall be deemed unsafe and improper to be disclosed."2 9
Washington, carving out some room, notified the Senate that he had "directed
copies and translations to be made; except in those particulars which, in my
judgment, for public considerations, ought not to be communicated."3 ° Apparently,
the Senate accepted this arrangement, but had senators wanted to press the matter,
they might have forced the release of more material. As Abraham Sofaer notes,
"[N]othing would have prevented a majority from demanding the material, especially
in confidence, or from using their power over foreign policy, funds and offices to
pressure the President to divulge."'"
24 1 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 19, at 304.
25 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 38 (1794).
26 Cabinet Opinion of H. Knox, Alexander Hamilton, & Edm. Randolph (Jan. 28, 1794),
in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 505 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York,
Charles S. Francis & Co. 1851).
27 Id.
28 Id at 505-06.
29 Cabinet Opinion of Wm. Bradford (1793), in 4 THE WORKS OF HAMILTON, supra
note 26, at 494-95.
30 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 56 (1794).
" Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1318, 1321 (1975).
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D. The Jay Treaty
Another executive-legislative conflict occurred in 1796 after President
Washington informed Congress that the Jay Treaty had been ratified. His message
was sent on March 1, 1796.32 The very next day, Representative Edward Livingston
stated that "it was very desirable, therefore, that every document which might tend
to throw light on the subject should be before the House."33 He offered a resolution
that President Washington "be requested to lay before this House a copy of the
instructions given to the Minister of the United States who negotiated the Treaty with
Great Britain,... together with the correspondence and other documents relative to
the said Treaty." 4 Recognizing that some of the negotiations were probably
unfinished, Livingston modified his resolution by adding this language: "Excepting
such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be
disclosed."" Explaining the role of the House in the treaty process, Livingston said
that the House possessed "a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into effect,
or refusing it their sanction." 3 Without the papers, the House might decide to
withhold appropriations needed to implement the Treaty. Representative Albert
Gallatin agreed that the House did not have to acquiesce in decisions agreed to by the
President and the Senate ifa treaty encroached upon powers expressly reserved to the
House, such as the regulation of trade.37
After weeks of debate, the House supported the Livingston resolution by a margin
of 62 to 37.3S Curiously, some of the documents had already been shared with the
House. Livingston, as chairman of the House Committee on American Seamen,
"togetherwith the whole committee, had been allowed access to these papers, and had
inspected them. The same privilege, he doubted not, would be given to any member
of that House who would request it."39 It was during this period that Congress passed
legislation to provide for the relief and protection of American seamen, many of
whom had been impressed by Great Britain.40 One member of the House said that
with respect to the papers on the Jay Treaty, "he did not think there were any secrets
in them. He believed he had seen them all." 4 ' He remarked that "[flor the space of
ten weeks any member of that House might have seen them."42 Another member of
32 See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 394 (1796).
33 Id. at 400.
14 Id. at 400-01.
1s Id. at 426.
36 Id. at 428.
37 See id. at 437, 466-74.
38 See id. at 759.
39 Id. at 461 (statement of Rep. Harper).
40 See id. at 802-20.
41 Id. at 642 (statement of Rep. Williams).
42 Id. (statement of Rep. Williams).
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the House noted that his colleagues could have walked over to the office of the
Secretary of the Senate to see the papers, but why, he said, "depend upon the courtesy
of the Clerk for information which might as well be obtained in a more direct
channel?"43
Madison, who voted for Livingston's resolution, elaborated on his views
regarding executive-legislative struggles over information. He began by avowing his
intent to proceed "with the utmost respect to the decorum and dignity of the House,
with a proper delicacy to the other departments of Government, and, at the same time,
with fidelity and responsibility, for our constituents." He wanted the resolution
drafted in such a form "as not to bear even the appearance of encroaching on the
Constitutional rights of the Executive."'45 Livingston's amendment to his resolution,
Madison felt, went a long way toward removing constitutional objections." Madison
proposed the following language to further ease the tensions between the branches:
"Except so much of said papers as, in his judgment, it may not be consistent with the
interestofthe United States, at this time, to disclose."'47 Madison's amendment failed
by a vote of 37 to 47.48
In denying the House request for papers, Washington cited a number of reasons,
including the need for caution and secrecy in foreign negotiations as well as the
exclusive role of the Senate to participate as a member of the legislative branch in
treaty matters.49 Washington said that the only ground on which the House might
request documents regarding treaty instructions and negotiations would be
impeachment, "which the resolution has not expressed."50 Washington's decision to
withhold documents from the House was not an exercise of executive privilege,
because he acknowledged that "all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great
Britain were laid before the Senate, when theTreaty itself was communicated for
their consideration and advice."'"
Washington's message to the House is unsatisfactory on several grounds. First,
the House was not requesting documents as part of the treaty process. That process
was complete; the Jay Treaty had been negotiated, approved by the Senate, and
ratified. The House merely was requesting documents as part of the post-treaty
process-the appropriation of funds to implement the treaty. The House had a right
to whatever papers it needed to make an informed legislative judgment. Second,
Washington seemed to understand that right; a letter from Hamilton to Washington
3 Id. at 588 (statement of Rep. Freeman).
" Id. at 437 (statement of Rep. Madison).
4 Id. at 438 (statement of Rep. Madison).
46 See id
41 Id. (statement of Rep. Madison).
" See id.
49 See id. at 760-62.
SO Id. at 760.
"m Id. at 76 1.
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implied that Washington had initially considered giving the House the papers it
requested:
The'course you suggest has some obvious advantages & merits careful
consideration. I am not however without fears that there are things in the
instructions to Mr. Jay which good policy, considering the matter
externally as well as internally, would render it inexpedient to
communicate. This I shall ascertain to day. A middle course is under
consideration-that of not communicating the papers to the house but of
declaring that the Secretary of State is directed to permit them to be read
by the members individually."
In other words, because Washington seemed prepared to submit the papers to the
House, Hamilton was offering an intermediate position of retaining the papers in the
custody of the Secretary of State while allowing members of the House to come and
read them in his presence. The editor of Hamilton's papers reported that, in an
unfound letter to Hamilton, Washington "apparently suggested that he planned to
comply with the request in Livingston's resolution."3
Hamilton, no longer in the administration, later advised President Washington to
deny the House the documents it requested on the Jay Treaty. He thought that
production of the papers "cannot fail to start [a] new and unpleasant Game-it will
be fatal to the Negotiating Power of the Government if it is to be a matter of course
for a call of either House of Congress to bring forth all the communication however
confidential." 4 Having taken a hard line, Hamilton cautioned Washington not to
appear too abrupt or imperious when communicating to the House: "[A] too
peremptory and unqualified refusal might be liable to just criticism." 55 Hamilton's
admonishment was good advice.
Shortly after Washington's message to the House on the papers, Representative
Thomas Blount introduced two resolutions, which were both adopted 57 to 35, stating
that the House of Representatives did not claim any agency in making treaties,
but, that when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects
submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend,
for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by
52 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 24, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81-82 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
" Editor's Introductory note to Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington
(Mar. 7, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 66.
" Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 7, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 69 (alteration in original).
11 Id. at 69.
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Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of
Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or
inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act
thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public
good.56
Madison, supporting the Blount resolutions, said that the House "must have a
right, in all cases, to ask for information which might assist their deliberations on the
subjects submitted to them by the Constitution; being responsible, nevertheless, for
the propriety of the measure."57 Madison was "as ready to admit that the Executive
had a right, under a due responsibility, also, to withhold information, when of a
nature that did not permit a disclosure of it at the time."5" Yet, Madison expressed
some misgivings about Washington's rationale that the papers were not related to any
objective of the House:
[The rationale] implied that the Executive was not only to judge of the
proper objects and functions of the Executive department, but, also, of the
objects and functions of the House. He was not only to decide how far the
Executive trust would permit a disclosure of information, but how far the
Legislative trust could derive advantage from it. It belonged, he said, to
each department to judge for itself. If the Executive conceived that, in
relation to his own department, papers could not be safely communicated,
he might, on that ground, refuse them, because he was the competent
though a responsiblejudge within his own department. Ifthe papers could
be communicated without injury to the objects of his department, he ought
not to refuse them as irrelative to the objects of the House of
Representatives; because the House was, in such cases, the only proper
judge of its own objects. 9
The House had driven home its point: ifa treaty entered into by the President and
the Senate required legislation and appropriations to be carried out, the House would
be strongly positioned to insist on whatever papers and documentation it needed to
judge the merits of the treaty. Denied such information, it could threaten to block
implementation. It might easily tell the President: "Sorry, without additional
documents supplied by you, we have inadequate grounds to pass the necessary
legislation."
56 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796). For the votes, see id. at 782-83.
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Precisely those conditions prevailed in 1796 because President Washington
needed the support of both Houses to pass an appropriation of $90,000 to implement
the Jay Treaty.60 Congressman Samuel Maclay lamented the situation, noting that
members of the House, having been denied the papers they requested, "were left to
take their measures in the dark; or, in other words, they were called upon to act
without information.",6' He proposed the following preamble and resolution:
The House... are of opinion that [the treaty] is in many respects highly
injurious to the interests of the United States; yet, were they possessed of
any information which could justify the great sacrifices contained in the
Treaty, their sincere desire to cherish harmony and amicable intercourse
with all nations, and their earnest wish to co-operate in hastening a final
adjustment of the differences subsisting between the United States and
Great Britain, might have induced them to waive their objection to the
Treaty; ... Therefore,
Resolved, That, under the circumstances aforesaid, and with such
information as the House possess, it is not expedient at this time to concur
in passing the laws necessary for carrying the said Treaty into effect.62
The House never voted on Maclay's language. After a lengthy debate, the bill
to appropriate funds to implement the treaty passed by the narrow margin of 51 to
48.63 James Madison voted against the bill." An earlier test vote showed the House
divided 49 to 49, with the Speaker willing to break the tie to support the treaty.6' The
appropriation was enacted into law.66 Given the closeness of the vote, had the
opposition maintained a narrow margin, it seems reasonable that President
Washington would have shared with the House-or with a few selected
opponents-the documents needed to swing some votes.
E. The Louisiana Purchase
In 1803, after President Jefferson entered into negotiations with France for the
Louisiana Purchase, he had considerable doubts about the legality of what he had
done. On the basis of a provisional appropriation of $2 million to be applied toward
the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas, the Jefferson Administration entered
60 See id. at 991.
61 Id. at 970.
62 Id. at 970-71.
61 See id at 129 1.
' See id
65 See id. at 1280.
66 See 1 Stat. 459 (1796).
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into an agreement with France to buy the whole of the Louisiana Territory.67
Jefferson thought that the executive officials who had negotiated the terms "have done
an act beyond the Constitution." '68 Because Congress would have to "ratify and pay
for it,'' 9 the treaty "must of course be laid before both Houses, because both have
important functions to exercise respecting it."
7
Jefferson sent copies of the ratified treaty to both the House of Representatives
and the Senate, explaining: "You will observe that some important conditions can not
be carried into execution but with the aid of the Legislature, and that time presses a
decision on them without delay."' The House debated at length a resolution asking
Jefferson to submit certain papers and documents relating to the treaty.72 Some
portions of the resolution were adopted, others rejected.73 The resolution as a whole
went down to defeat, 57 to 59.74 With or-without the resolution, there is little doubt
that the administration was willing to provide the House with whatever documents it
needed to support the treaty. Subsequently, the House joined the Senate in passing
legislation to enable Jefferson to take possession of the Louisiana Territory.75
F. Subsequent Disputes
On other occasions, the House opposed treaties that required appropriations, two
examples being the Gadsden Purchase Treaty with Mexico in 185376 and the Alaskan
Purchase Treaty with Russia in 1867.77 The need to have support from both houses
for certain treaties was recognized in a reciprocity treaty with the Hawaiian Islands
in 1876.78 A proviso made the treaty dependent on the consent by both houses. 79 A
commercial treaty with Mexico in 1883 contained a clause making its validity
67 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 407, 408 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., Definitive ed. 1907).
68 Id. at411.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 410.
71 Special Message to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States (Oct.
21, 1803), in I A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-
1902, at 362-63 (James D. Richardson ed., 1905); see also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 18, 382
(1803).
72 See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 385 (1803).
71 See id, at 385-419.
74 See id. at 419.
75 See 2 Stat. 245, 247 (1803).
76 See Ivan M. Stone, The House of Representatives and the Treaty-Making Power, 17
KY. L.J. 216, 233 n.53 (1929).
77 See id.
78 See id. at 234.
"9 Chalfant Robinson, The Treaty-Making Power of the House of Representatives, 12
YALE REV. 191 (1903); see also Stone, supra note 76, at 234-35.
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dependent on action by both houses."0 The House Committee on Ways and Means
interpreted the language to mean that the House had a voice in treaties affecting
revenue." Although additional conventions extended the time available for
congressional approval, the House refused to support the treaty and it did not take
effect.82 The use of statutes that authorize reciprocal trade agreements have also
protected the prerogatives of the House in other matters of foreign commerce, tariffs,
and revenues.83
The House continues to make its will felt in treaty matters. Although the Ford
Administration believed it could enter into an executive agreement with regard to
military bases in Spain, the Senate insisted it be done by treaty.84 Later, members of
both the House and the Senate objected to language in the treaty that appeared to
make appropriations mandatory over a five-year period.85 In the end, the prerogatives
of the appropriations and authorization committees were respected. The Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent contained a declaration that the sums referred to
in the Spanish treaty "shall be made available for obligation through the normal
procedures of the Congress, including the process of prior authorization and annual
appropriations. ' 86  Congress enacted legislation in 1976 to authorize the
appropriation of funds needed to implement the Spanish treaty.87
The Spanish Bases Treaty was replaced by an executive agreement in 1982, but
congressional interests were again protected. The agreement stipulated that the
supply of defense articles and services are subject to "the annual authorizations and
appropriations contained in United States security assistance legislation.""8 Although
the agreement promised support "in the highest amounts, the most favorable terms,
and the widest variety of forms," it also conditioned such support on what "may be
80 See Stone, supra note 76, at 235.
"I See 2 ARTHUR C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1526,
at 990 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS' PRECEDENTS].
82 See 24 Stat. 1018 (1886); 25 Stat. 1370 (1885); 24 Stat. 975 (1883); 2 HINDS'
PRECEDENTS, supra note 81, §§ 1526-1528, at 990-91.
83 For the development of reciprocal trade legislation, see Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS 133-55 (1972).
84 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 239 (1977).
85 See id
86 S. REP. NO. 94-94 1, at 2 (1976).
87 See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, § 507,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, 765 (1976); see also Pub. L. No. 94-537, 90 Stat. 2498
(1996) (authorizing appropriations for the International Security Assistance and Arms
Control Act of 1976).
88 Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain, July 2, 1982, U.S.-Spain, Complementary Agreement
Three, Art. 2, 34 U.S.T. 3966, 3966.
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lawful and feasible."89 In blunter terms: Spain would get what Congress decided.
The role of the House in international agreements was debated again in 1994
when President Clinton submitted the Uruguay Round Agreements to Congress as a
bill rather than as a treaty." The purpose of the bill was to implement the worldwide
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).9 Professor Laurence H. Tribe
testified that certain features of the bill would so alter the dynamics of state-federal
relations that ratification of a treaty by two-thirds of the Senate was necessary, given
the Senate's special role in representing the states as political units. 2 However, there
are no clear constitutional guidelines on the types of national policy that must be
included in a treaty only and not in a statute. The subject matter of NAFTA and
GATT-international trade-is certainly within the constitutional jurisdiction of
Congress as a whole to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" 93 and therefore
merits action by both houses through the regular statutory process. 94
II. USING CONGRESSIONAL LEVERAGE
Exquisite legal and constitutional arguments may have to play second fiddle to
the political leverage that Congress can exert when it wants. As mentioned
previously, this may involve the simple act of having to appropriate funds to
implement a treaty, thus elevating the House to equal partnership with the Senate.
Either house may decide to roll out heavy artillery to get the administration's attention
by unleashing the impeachment power or holding an executive official in contempt
of Congress. On other occasions, the administration may agree reluctantly to release
sensitive papers and documents because that is the only way to jump-start the
confirmation process.9"
A. The Impeachment Power
When President Washington denied the House the papers it requested regarding
the Jay Treaty, he said that the only ground on which the House might have
89 Id.
9 See Uruguay Round Agreements, submitted Sept. 27, 1994.
9' See (check the purposes section of the bill).
9 See GA 7TImplementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 302-12 (1994) (statement of
Harvard Law School Prof. Laurence H. Tribe).
9' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
' See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
" See Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, Le Privilege de E Exdcutif Aux ltats-Unis 221-351
(1999).
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legitimately requested the documents was impeachment, "which the resolution has not
expressed."" Presumably, if Congress had requested the documents on that basis,
Washington would have acquiesced. The power of impeachment, said President Polk,
gives to the House of Representatives:
the right to investigate the conduct of all public officers under the
Government. This is cheerfully admitted. In such a case the safety of the
Republic would be the supreme law, and the power of the House in the
pursuit of this object would penetrate into the most secret recesses of the
Executive Departments. It could command the attendance of any and
every agent of the Government, and compel them toproduce all papers,
public or private, official or unofficial, and to testify on oath to all facts
within their knowledge.9
Even short of impeachment, the exercise of executive privilege is inappropriate
when there are serious charges of administrative malfeasance. President Jackson, a
zealous defender of executive prerogatives, told Congress that if it could:
point to any case where there is the slightest reason to suspect corruption
or abuse of trust, no obstacle which I can remove shall be interposed to
prevent the fullest scrutiny by all legal means. The offices of all the
departments will be opened to you, and every proper facility furnished for
this purpose.98
The Supreme Court has noted that the power of Congress to conduct
investigations "comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to
expose corruption, inefficiency or waste." '
While defending a broad theory of executive privilege, Attorney General William
French Smith admitted in 1982 that he would not try "to shield documents [from
Congress] which contain evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials
from proper review."' During a news conference in 1983, President Ronald Reagan
said, "[W]e will never invoke executive privilege to cover up wrongdoing."' 0 ' It
would not be the first time. After the Iran-Contra story broke in November 1986,
96 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
9, Special Message to the House of Representatives (Apr. 20, 1846), in A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1902, supra note 71, at 431,
434.
98 13 CONG. DEB. app. at 202 (1836-37). For the entire discussion, see id at 189-225.
9 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
t~ Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Rep. John Dingell, reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 97-968, at 41 (1982).
0' The President's News Conference, I PUB. PAPERS 238, 239 (Feb. 16, 1983).
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President Reagan permitted his two former national security advisers, Robert
McFarlane and John Poindexter, to testify before Congress, °2 allowed his Cabinet
officials, including Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, to discuss with Congress their conversations with the President,0 3 and
made available to Congress thousands of sensitive, classified documents.'0 4 The
purpose of this extraordinary cooperation was to forestall any possibility of an
impeachment effort.'
B. The Contempt Power
When executive officials refuse to comply with a congressional request for
information, the contempt power may be used as an instrument of legislative coercion.
In 1975, Congress clashed with the executive branch over reports compiled by the
Department of Commerce identifying U.S. companies that had been asked tojoin the
Arab boycott of Israel.'"° Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton initially refused to
comply with a subpoena from a House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
subcommittee, but the prospect of contempt proceedings was sufficient incentive for
him to release the material to the subcommittee.'07
In 1980, President Carter threatened to withhold documents concerning his oil
import fee. After a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee
voted to hold Energy Secretary Charles W. Duncan, Jr., in contempt of Congress for
refusing to produce the documents, Duncan bowed to the congressional will.'08 White
House Senior Associate Counsel Douglas B. Huron said that he did not think that
executive privilege ever was asserted formally, although the White House considered
it.'09 In any event, the subcommittee received the material it wanted.
In 1982, the House actually voted to hold in contempt Anne (Gorsuch) Burford,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), when she refused to
302 See THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS 498
(1991).
303 See id. at 540.
,o Theodore Draper, Foreword to THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL: THE DECLASSIFIED
HISTORY, at xiii (Peter Kombluh & Malcolm Byme eds., 1993); see generally THE IRAN-
CONTRA SCANDAL, supra (containing a collection of documents relating to the Iran-Contra
affair).
05 Attorney General Edwin Meese III thought the Iran-Contra affair had the potential
for "toppling" the President and triggering impeachment proceedings in the House. See
Testimony in trial of Oliver North (Mar. 28, 1989) in DRAPER, supra note 102, at 521.
'06 See 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 343 (1975).
307 See 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 343-44 (1975); see also 121. CONG. REC. 33,872-76,
36,038-39, 40,230, 40,768-69 (1975) (noting highlights of the proceedings for the record).
308 See Elder Witt, Carter Foiled in First Tilt With Executive Privilege, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP., May 17, 1980, at 1352.
"o See Executive Privilege, Revisited, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 21, 1980, at 1753.
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release certain documents."0 The House Public Works Committee, seeking
documents on the EPA's enforcement of the "Superfund" program, was advised by
the agency that there would be no objection "so long as the confidentiality of the
information in those files was maintained.""' Shortly thereafter, the Reagan
Administration decided that Congress could not see, under any circumstances,
documents in active litigation files." 2 A memorandum from President Reagan to
Gorsuch claimed that the documents in question represented "internal deliberative
materials containing enforcement strategy and statements of the Government's
position on various legal issues which may be raised in enforcement actions relative
to the various hazardous waste sites" by the EPA or the Justice Department." 3
Accepting that position, congressional oversight would have to be put on hold for
years until the government completed its enforcement and litigation actions.
After the committee held Gorsuch in contempt, the House of Representatives
voted 259 to 105 to support the contempt citation.' "4 To create the top-heavy
majority, 55 Republicans joined 204 Democrats." 5 After the matter had a short
detour to court, the Administration eventually agreed to release "enforcement
sensitive" documents to Congress." 6 Although the legislative branch eventually
prevailed,"' the litigation highlighted a serious weakness of the contempt process.
If the President opposes the release of documents to Congress, there is little likelihood
that the Justice Department will vigorously prosecute someone in the administration
who is doing the President's bidding. At the very least, the ability of the
administration to take the matter to court will delay the delivery of documents to
Congress. "'
In 1995, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight began a
detailed inquiry into the firing of seven Travel Office employees at the Clinton White
House." 9 After the President invoked executive privilege to keep documents from the
committee, it voted 27 to 19 to hold White House Counsel Jack Quinn in contempt. 20
"10 See 128 CONG. REC. 31746-76 (1982).
"' H.R. REP. No. 97-968, at 11 (1982).
112 See id. at 15,21.
" Id. at 42.
"4 See 128 CONG. REC. 31,746-76 (1982).
115 See id.
116 See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983); H.R.
REP. NO. 98-323, at 18-40 (1983).
"7 See House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 153.
" See Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving
a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands





Before the contempt citation could be taken to the floor, the disputed documents were
released to the committee.12'
C. The Appointment Power
Until the President submits the name of a nominee to the Senate, Congress has
no grounds for gaining access to the files relating to the individual's employment with
the government. Requests for personnel and medical files might be regarded by the
President as unwarranted intrusions into personal privacy. President Grover
Cleveland once withheld from the Senate various papers and documents that pertained
to a suspended official. The power to remove, he said, was solely an executive
prerogative and could not be shared or compromised with the Senate. ' 22
If the President, on the other hand, is trying to insure confirmation and needs the
cooperation and goodwill of the Senate, he may be forced to surrender documents that
could otherwise be withheld under the doctrine of executive privilege. On July 31,
1986, President Reagan invoked executive privilege to deny to the Senate certain
internal memos that Chief Justice-designee William H. Rehnquist had written while
serving in the Justice Department from 1969 to 1971.123 The reason given for
withholding the memos was familiar: to protect the confidentiality and candor of the
legal advice submitted to presidents and their assistants. 24 Nevertheless, Democrats
on the Senate Judiciary Committee began rounding up votes to subpoena the
papers.'25 Committee Democrats had agreed with Republicans to vote on both
Rehnquist and Associate Justice-designee Antonin Scalia on August 14, but the
impasse over the papers threatened to delay the votes.'2 6
In an op-ed piece for the Los Angeles Times, Senator Edward M. Kennedy put
the matter succinctly: "Rehnquist: No Documents, No Senate Confirmation.' 27
Hoping to move the nominations of Rehnquist and Scalia along, President Reagan
agreed to a narrowed request by the committee for twenty-five to thirty documents
written by Rehnquist during his career in the Justice Department. 2 The eight
"2' See David Johnston, Panel Acts to Gain Travel Office Papers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1996, at A26; Eric Schmitt, White House Gives Committee More Papers in Dismissal Case,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A20.
122 See Louis Fisher, Grover Cleveland and the Senate, 7 CONG. STUD. 11 (1979).
" George Lardner, Jr. & Al Kamen, Reagan Uses Executive Privilege to Keep
Rehnquist Memos Secret, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1986, at Al.
124 See id.
125 See Howard Kurtz & Ruth Marcus, Democrats Seek to Subpoena Papers, WASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 1986, at Al.
26 See George Lardner, Jr. & Al Kamen, Senators to Push for Rehnquist Memos, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1986, at A4.
127 Edward M. Kennedy, Rehnquist: No Documents, No Senate Confirmation, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1986, Part II, at 5.
128 See Al Kamen & Howard Kurtz, Rehnquist Told in 1974 of Restriction in Deed,
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Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee picked up two moderate Republicans
to form a majority in favor of a subpoena.'29 A few days later the Committee
requested and received additional documents prepared by Rehnquist for the Justice
Department. 3° The nominations of Rehnquist and Scalia then went forward as
scheduled.''
Two years later, the Senate replayed the same drama. The nomination of Stephen
S. Trott for Ninth Circuitjudge was delayed four months because Senators Kennedy
and Howard Metzenbaum wanted internal documents from the Justice Department.'32
Refusing to release the documents, the department explained: "'As you know, it is
a longstanding policy ofthe Department notto provide copies of internal, deliberative
memoranda to persons outside the Department."" 33  That may have been
"longstanding policy," but the Trott nomination did not proceed until the Department
yielded, which it eventually did. Having received the documents they wanted,
Kennedy and Metzenbaum released their hold.' 4
In 1991, the appointment of the U.S. Ambassador to Guyana was delayed
seventeen months until Senator Jesse Helms received documents he wanted from the
State Department.13 During a visit by Helms to Chile in 1985, one of his aides was
accused of leaking U.S. intelligence information to the government of former Chilean
President Augusto Pinochet 36 Helms insisted that the State Department show him
secret cable traffic regarding the visit, but the Department refused to turn over two
cables, which they called internal memoranda. 37
When the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Chile was later
nominated in June 1990 for the position of ambassador to Chile, 3 Helms had the
necessary leverage. After Helms renewed his request for the cables and the State
Department again refused, he'blocked the nomination. 39 As the months rolled by and
Helms held firm, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger came to Helms'
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1986, at Al.
129 See id.
"30 See Senators Are Given More Rehnquist Data, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1986, at A3.
13 See Al Kamen, Rehnquist Confirmed In 65-33 Senate Vote; Scalia Approved as
Associate Justice, 98-0, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1986, at Al.
132 See Ruth Marcus, Impasse Over Justice Documents Ends, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
1988, at A23.
131 Id. (quoting Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton).
134 See id.
131 See Al Kamen, Ambassador to Guyana is AppointedAfter 17-Month Standoff, WASH.







office one day to show him the memos, which had been critical of both Helms and his
aide. Helms released the hold and the nomination went forward.
40
In March 1994, a House subcommittee subpoenaed the records of six cases
handled by the Environment and Natural Resources Division of -the Justice
Department. 14' The subcommittee's request reflected congressional interest for the
past several years in the work of the Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) and the
shift of prosecution responsibilities from U.S. Attorneys in the field to Washington
officials. 142 In an effort to mediate the dispute, Attorney General Janet Reno allowed
subcommittee staff to interview line attorneys within ECS. 43 President Clinton did
not intervene in this subcommittee-department dispute. White House Communications
Director Mark Gearan announced, "'We will not assert any privilege or waiver.',
1 44
In addition to sending the subpoenas, subcommittee chairman John Dingell (D-
Mich.) and ranking minority member Dan Schaefer (R-Colo.) released letters to the
Senate Judiciary Committee asking that the confirmation of Lois Schiffer be
delayed. 41 She had been serving as Acting Attorney General ofthe Environment and
Natural Resources Division and had been nominated for the position on February 2,
1994. 146 Schaefer expressed his concern about her confirmation because of what he
described as "'obstruction of the subcommittee's work on oversight of the nation's
environmental laws."",1
47
As the dispute deepened, ECS chief Neil S. Cartusciello announced his
resignation.4 4 By that time, the subcommittee had begun receiving some of the
documents it had subpoenaed. 49 After Schiffer moved to find a replacement for
Cartusciello, the hearing on her nomination tentatively was scheduled. 50 After some
further delays, and after the subcommittee was satisfied with the cooperation it had
received from the Justice Department, Schiffer was confirmed by the Senate on
October 6, 1994.'
140 See id.
4' See Jim McGee, House Panel Subpoenas Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1994, at A4.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Id. (quoting Mark Gearan).
141 See id
146 See id.
"4, Id. (quoting Rep. Shafer).
141 See Jim McGee, Environmental Crimes Controversy Lingers Under Reno, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at A25.
149 See Jim McGee, Chief of Environmental Crimes Section Quits, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
1994, at A4.
ISo See Al Kamen, Teaming Up, WASH. POST, July 13, 1994, at AIS.
151 See 140 CONG. REC. 28359-60 (1994). For further details on this controversy, see
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 103D CONG., DAMAGING DISARRAY: ORGANIZATION BREAKDOWN AND
REFORM IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM, 103-T
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These examples illustrate that Congress has sufficient tools at its command to
wrest from the executive branch the documents it needs to fulfill congressional duties.
The question is whether lawmakers will press their advantage. The issue is "not the
adequacy of congressional power to obtain information, but the willingness of
committee chairs and staffers to aggressively pursue information."' 152
III. SHOUTING "NATIONAL SECURITY" IS NOT ENOUGH
Those who write about executive privilege sometimes imply that the mere claim
by the administration of "national security" (or "foreign affairs" or "diplomacy") is
sufficient to establish an unreviewable presidential power. In a recent article,
Saikrishna Prakash writes that "national security considerations strongly bolster the
case for an executive privilege. ... Properly wielded, an executive privilege could
lead to ... enhanced supervision of foreign affairs ....
Writing for the Court in the Watergate tapes case, Chief Justice Burger rejected
an "absolute, unqualified" presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process.'54
However, in clumsy dicta, he seemed to cede ground ifthe President claimed a "need
to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets."'" If the
Supreme Court wants to accept such presidential arguments, it is free to do so.
Congress, however, should not follow in its steps. The Watergate tapes case
concerned judicial, not congressional, access to executive branch information." 6
Unlike thejudiciary, Congress has express constitutional powers and duties in the
fields of military affairs and national security. When Congress passed the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), requiring executive agencies to make documents available
to the public, it set forth nine exemptions from the Act, including matters that are
"(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order."' 157 Another exemption
excluded "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 ' Yet
another exemption excluded "records or information compiled for law enforcement
(Comm. Print 1994); Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes:
A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 123-25 (1996).
152 Devins, supra note 151, at 133.
'53 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1999).
154 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
155 Id.
156 A footnote in the Court's decision makes this distinction clear: "We are not here
concerned with... congressional demands for information . . ." Id. at 712 n. 19.
157 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1994).
15 Id. § 552(b)(5).
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purposes."" 9 These exemptions are some of the grounds for denying members of the
public information from executive agencies. They do not apply to Congress; FOIA
specifically provides that these exemptions do not constitute "authority to withhold
information from Congress."'160
A. Controlling National Security Information
A 1996 memorandum prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice
Department (OLC) argued that a congressional enactment "would be unconstitutional
if it were interpreted 'to divest the President of his control over national security
information in the Executive Branch by vesting lower-ranking personnel in that
Branch with a "right" to furnish such information to a Member of Congress without
receiving official authorization to do so. '''16 1 OLC based this position on the
following separation of powers rationale:
[T]he President's roles as Commander in Chief, head of the Executive
Branch, and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations require that
he have ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention
and dissemination of intelligence and other national security information
in the Executive Branch. There is no exception to this principle for those
disseminations that would be made to Congress or its Members. In that
context, as in all others, the decision whether to grant access to the
information must be made by someone who is acting in an official
capacity on behalf of the President and who is ultimately responsible,
perhaps through intermediaries, to the President. The Constitution does
not permit Congress to circumvent these orderly procedures and chain of
command-and to erect an obstacle to the President's exercise of all
executive powers relating to the Nation's security-by vesting lower-level
employees in the Executive Branch with a supposed "right" to disclose
national security information to Members of Congress (or anyone else)
without the authorization of Executive Branch personnel who derive their
authority from the President.'
According to this analysis, two congressional statutes and pending language in
159 Id. § 552(b)(7).
160 Id. § 552(d).
i61 Memorandum from Christopher H. Schroeder, Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael
J. O'Neil, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Nov. 26, 1996, at 3 (on file
with author) [hereinafter OLC Memo].
262 Id. at 4.
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a Senate bill were unconstitutional. 6 3 The Department's position relies on
generalizations and misconceptions about the President's roles as Commander in
Chief, head of the executive branch, and "sole organ" of the nation in its external
relations.
1. Commander in Chief
The Constitution empowers the President to be Commander in Chief, but that title
must be understood in the context of military responsibilities that the Constitution
grants to Congress. Article II reads, "The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .""6 For the militia,
Congress-not the President-does the calling. The Constitution gives to Congress
the power to provide "for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel invasions." 6 ' The Commander in Chief Clause also
was intended to preserve civilian supremacy.'66
Article I empowers Congress to declare war, raise and support armies, and make
rules for the land and naval forces. The debates at the Philadelphia Convention made
clear that the Commander in Chief Clause did not grant the President unilateral,
independent power other than the power to "repel sudden attacks."'67 Roger Sherman
said the President should be able "to repel and not to commence war."'68 Taking the
country from a state of peace to a state of war was a deliberative process that
required congressional debate and approval. James Mason told his colleagues that
he was for "clogging rather than facilitating war."'69 At the Philadelphia ratifying
convention, James Wilson expressed the prevailing sentiment that the system of
checks and balances "will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in
W,70such distress ....
The framers gave Congress the power to initiate war because they believed that
presidents, in the search for fame and personal glory, would have a bias that favored
war.' 7' John Jay warned in Federalist No. 4 that "absolute monarchs will often make
163 See infra Pt. III.D.
'64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
165 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
's See 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 79(1861).
167 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES].
168 Id.
169 Id. at 319.
170 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941).
"' See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,
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war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely
personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition,
or private compacts toaggrandize or support their particular families or partisans."1
72
James Madison made the same point. Writing in 1793, he called war:
the true nurse of executive aggrandizement ... In war, the honours and
emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive
patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that
laurels are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to
encircle.7
3
The historical record is replete with examples of Congress relying on the regular
legislative process, including access to information held by the executive branch, to
control the President's actions in military affairs. 74 There is no evidence from these
sources that the Framers intended the Commander in Chief Clause to deny to
members of Congress information needed to supervise the executive branch and learn
of agency wrongdoing.
2. Head of the Executive Branch
The Framers placed the President at the head of the executive branch to provide
for unity, responsibility, and accountability. There can be no doubt that such an
authorization of power was an important principle for assuring that the President,
under Article II, Section 3, was positioned to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' ' The delegates at the Constitutional Convention rejected the idea of a
plural executive, preferring to anchor that responsibility in a single individual. Said
John Rutledge, "A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer
the public affairs best."'17
6
Yet, placing the President at the head of the executive branch did not remove
from Congress the power to direct certain executive activities and to gain access to
information needed for the performance of its legislative duties. At the Convention,
Roger Sherman considered the Executive "nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect."' 77 It was never the purpose to make
the President personally responsible for executing all the laws. Rather, he was to
82 CORNELL L. REv. 695, 699-700 (1997).
'72 THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 101 (John Jay) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
'73 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
174 See generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995).
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
176 1 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 167, at 65.
177 Id.
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ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, including laws that excluded him from
some operations in the executive branch. For example, from an early date, Congress
vested in certain subordinate executive officials the duty to carry out specified
"ministerial" functions without interference from the President.'78 On many
occasions, attorneys general have advised presidents that they have no legal right to
interfere with administrative decisions made by the auditors and comptrollers in the
Treasury Department,7 pension officers, 8 ' and other officials.' The President is
responsible for seeing that administrative officers faithfully perform their duties, "but
the statutes regulate and prescribe these duties, and he has no more power to add to,
or subtract from, the duties imposed upon subordinate executive and administrative
officers by the law, than those officers have to add or subtract from his duties."' 82
In several decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can impose
certain duties on executive officials that are beyond the control and direction of the
President.'83
These principles were underscored by a confrontation during the Reagan
administration. In 1984, Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA)' to give the Comptroller General certain authorities over agency
contracting. President Reagan signed the bill, but instructed Attorney General Edwin
Meese III to inform all executive branch agencies how to comply with the statute "in
a manner consistent with the Constitution."'' A memorandum from the Justice
Department concluded that the contested provision for the Comptroller General was
unconstitutional and should not be enforced by the agencies. 186 In effect, the
administration had exercised an item veto by deciding what parts of a statute to carry
out. This was part of a larger strategy devised by enthusiasts who believed in the
"7 See Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 127-28 (1998).
7 See, e.g., 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624 (1823); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 636 (1824).
ISo See, e.g., 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515 (1846).
.8 See, e.g., I Op. Att'y Gen. 678 (1824); l Op. Att'y Gen. 705 (1825); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
706 (1825); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 480 (1831); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1832); 2 Op. Att'y Gen.
544 (1832); 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 287 (1851); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 14 (1864); 13 Op. Att'y Gen.
28 (1869).
182 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 685, 686-87 (1890).
.83 See, e.g., United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249, 253-55 (1898); United States v.
Price, 116 U.S. 43, 44 (1885); Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 68 (1884); United States
v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378,394-95 (1880); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 522, 610 (1838).
18 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1994).
185 2 PUB. PAPERS 1053 (1984).
86 See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Attorney
General, "Implementation of the Bid Protest Provisions of the Competition in Contracting
Act" (Oct. 17, 1984), at 15 (on file with the author).
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theory of a "unitary executive," with all parts of the executive branch directly
accountable and subordinate to the President.'87
This theory was repeatedly struck down in the courts. In upholding the
provisions of CICA, aNew Jersey district courtjudge stated that the position of the
Reagan administration "flatly violates the express instruction of the Constitution that
the President shall 'take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."" 88 Once a bill
is enacted into law, the President executes all of it, notjust the parts he favors. The
district court's ruling was upheld on appeal by the Third Circuit. 9 The Ninth
Circuit, in upholding the Comptroller General provision, said that once Reagan put
his signature to CICA it became "part of the law of the land and the President must
'take care that [it] be faithfully executed.""" In his role as head of the executive
branch, the President has no authority to "employ a so-called 'line item veto' and
excise or sever provisions of a bill with which he disagrees."' 9 ' A later attempt by
the Justice Department to challenge the constitutionality of CICA also was turned
aside in the courts.
1 92
Agencies have a direct responsibility to Congress, the body that creates them. In
1854, Attorney General Caleb Cushing advised departmental heads that they had a
threefold relation: to the President, to execute his will in cases in which the President
possessed a constitutional or legal discretion; to the law, which directs them to
perform certain acts; and to Congress, "in the conditions contemplated by the
Constitution."' 93 Agencies are created by law and "most of their duties are prescribed
by law; Congress may at all times call on them for information or explanation in
matters of official duty; and it may, if it sees fit, interpose by legislation concerning
them, when required by the interests of the Government."' 94
8 For an excellent analysis of the deficiencies of this theory, see Morton Rosenberg,
Congress'Prerogative Over Agencies andAgency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise
of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
627 (1989).
188 Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.
N.J. 1985) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see also Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 607 F. Supp. 962 (D. N.J. 1985).
89 See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979, 980 (3d
Cir. 1986); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 876 (3d
Cir. 1986).
,90 Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7).
191 Id.
92 See United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 811, 816 (D.D.C. 1992).
'9' 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 344 (1854).
194 Id.
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3. "Sole Organ" in Foreign Affairs
During debate in the House of Representatives in 1800, John Marshall said that
the President "is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."' 5 This remark was later incorporated in Justice
Sutherland's opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,196 to suggest
that the President is the exclusive policymaker in foreign affairs. 97 However, Justice
Sutherland wrenched Marshall's statement from context to imply a position that
Marshall never held. At no time, either in 1800 or later, did Marshall ever suggest
that the President could act unilaterally to make foreign policy in the face of statutory
limitations.
The debate in 1800 focused on the decision of President John Adams to turn over
to England someone who had been charged with murder.' Because the case was
already pending in an American court, some members of Congress thought that
President Adams should be impeached for encroaching upon the judiciary and
violating the doctrine of separated powers.'" It was then that Marshall intervened to
say that there was no basis for impeachment." Adams, by carrying out an
extradition treaty entered into between England and the United States, was not
attempting to make national policy single-handedly. Instead, he was carrying out a
policy made jointly by the President and the Senate (for treaties).2 ' Only after the
policy had been formulated through the collective effort of the executive and
legislative branches (by treaty or by statute) did the President emerge as the "sole
organ" in implementing national policy. The President merely announcedpolicy; he
did not alone make it. Consistent with that principle, Marshall later decided a case
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and ruled that, in a conflict between a
presidential proclamation and a congressional statute governing the seizure of foreign
vessels during wartime, the statute prevails. 202
Sutherland's use of the "sole organ" remark in Curtiss-Wright prompted Justice
Robert Jackson to say in 1952 that the most that can be drawn from Sutherland's
decision is the intimation that the President "might act in external affairs without
congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an act of Congress."20 3
Jackson also noted that "much ofthe [Sutherland] opinion is dictum."0 4 In 1981, the
195 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
196 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
197 See id at 320.
198 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 532 (1800).
'99 See id. at 552 (statement of Rep. Harper).
200 See id at 596 (statement of Rep. Marshall).
201 See id. at 597, 613-14.'
202 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).




District of Columbia Circuit cautioned against placing undue reliance on "certain
dicta" in Sutherland's opinion: "To the extent that denominating the President as the
'sole organ' of the United States in international affairs constitutes a blanket
endorsement of plenary Presidential power over any matter extending beyond the
borders of this country, we reject that characterization." ' 5
B. Role of the Courts
In the period immediately after World War II, federal courts typically deferred
to presidential responsibilities in military and diplomatic affairs. In 1948, the
Supreme Court said it would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions ofthe Executive taken on information properly
held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into
executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the
very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial." 6
A few years later, in the midst of the Korean War, the Court again avoided a
clash with the executive branch over national security affairs. It said that the
Judiciary "should notjeopardize the security which the [government's] privilege [to
withhold evidence from a pending lawsuit] is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers."20 7
, These attitudes have long since been superseded by statutory grants of power to
the courts, inviting them to exercise independent judgment on matters of national
security."' Nevertheless, some courts continue to deferto the President. In 1980, the
Fourth Circuit remarked that the "executive possesses unparalleled expertise to make
the decision whether to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance, whereas the
judiciary is largely inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that
lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance."20 9 The Fourth Circuit freely expressed
its uneasiness in this area: "[T]he courts are unschooled in diplomacy and military
affairs, a mastery of which would be essential to passing upon an executive branch
request that a foreign intelligence wiretap be authorized."210 The court even referred
205 American Intern. Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430,438 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
206 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
207 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
203 See infra Pt. III.B.2.
209 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980).
210 Id. at 913-14.
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to the executive branch "as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs. ' 21' However
obsequious federal judges decide to behave, Congress-given its explicit
constitutional duties--does not have to assume the same posture.
1. The Pentagon Papers
In the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, the Supreme Court decided that two
newspapers were constitutionally entitled to publish a Defense Department secret
study that was critical of U.S. policy in the Vietnam War.12 Justice Stewart wrote
a concurrence that spoke approvingly of independent president power:
If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power
in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national
defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely
unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security
necessary to exercise that power successfully. 2
1 3
At first glance, this sentence seems logical: if one clause is valid, the other
follows. There is, however, no necessary linkage between the two. The President's
largely unshared power to conduct foreign affairs does not imply a largely unshared
power to determine the policy for internal security. The conduct of foreign policy
usually involves the implementation of national security policy determined jointly by
Congress and the President. Conduct may be executive, but the policymaking power
is executive-legislative. That proposition is true to an even greater extent in the
"maintenance of our national defense," as Justice Stewart expressed it.214 Congress
shares that responsibility with the President. In the field of foreign affairs, the
Constitution does not give "a large degree of unshared power" either to Congress or
to the President.1 5
Justice Stewart offered other broad views about presidential power:
[I]t is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as a
matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts
know law-through the promulgation and enforcement of executive
regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its
2,1 Id. at 914.
22 SeeNew York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
213 Id. at 728-29 (Stewart, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2' Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national
defense. 1
6
No one doubts that the President has important duties and prerogatives in protecting
confidential information. The more difficult question is the degree to which Congress
can share in those duties and prerogatives by enacting restrictive legislation and, on
that issue, Stewart's concurrence provides no answer.
Justice Stewart did acknowledge that the President lacks a monopoly: "This is
not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play." ' Yet, he appeared to
assign to Congress a narrow, subordinate role: "Undoubtedly Congress has the
power to enact specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government property
and preserve government secrets."2"8 In any event, a single concurrence by one
justice has no authoritative value in settling or defining constitutional issues.
Two other points about the Stewart concurrence deserve comment. First, his
overall analysis depends almost entirely upon a single case, Curtiss- Wright," 9 which
is itself deeply flawed. Second, largely because he concluded that the presidential
power in national defense and international relations is "largely unchecked by the
Legislative and Judicial branches," ' and that there is "the absence of the
governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life,"22' he
concluded that the Pentagon documents should be published in the newspapers.
Because of what he believed to be inadequate governmental checks on presidential
power, Justice Stewart declared that "the only effective restraint upon executive
policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in
an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can
here protect the values of democratic government."222 It was for that reason that he
supported "an informed and free press" to enlighten the people.223
2. Recent Statutory Changes
Judicial attitudes have become somewhat more emboldened in recent decades, in
part because of congressional legislation. In 1973, the Supreme Court decided that
it had no authority to examine in camera certain documents regarding a planned
216 Id. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
218 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
219 See id. at 727 n.2, 728-29 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
220 Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
221 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
222 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
223 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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underground nuclear test to sift out "non-secret components" for their release.224 In
response, Congress passed legislation that clearly authorized courts to examine
executive records in judges' chambers as part of a determination of..the nine
categories of exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act.225 The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197826 required a court order to engage in electronic
surveillance within the United States for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence
information.227 The Chief Justice appoints a special court, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), to review applications submitted by government
attorneys.228 In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) 229 to establish court procedures for allowing judges to screen classified
information to determine whether it could be used during the trial.230
These statutes bring the courts a long way in terms of attitude, procedures, and
capability in passing judgment on national security matters. Even if courts were to
continue to defer to the President, the same attitude should not be taken by Congress.
Unlike the courts, Congress has explicit duties under the Constitution to declare
war, 23 provide for the common defense, 232 raise and support armies, 23 3 and provide
and maintain a navy. 34 Legislative expertise exists in the Armed Services
Committees, the defense appropriations subcommittees, the Budget Committees, the
intelligence committees, and other legislative panels.
Deference towards the executive branch by the courts need not mean deference
by Congress. Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court---one in 1988 and the
other in 1989-have been misinterpreted by the executive branch and some scholars
to confer an unwarranted independent authority on the part of the President in foreign
affairs and national security.
3. Department of the Navy v. Egan
A memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1996 relied in part on
224 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 78 (1973).
25 See Freedom of Information Act Amendments § 4(B), Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1562 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at
8-9, 11-12 (1974).
226 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994)).
227 See 50 U.S.C. § 1802.
228 See id.
229 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (1994)).
230 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4.
23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 11.
232 See id art. I, § 8, cf. 1.
233 See id. art. I, § 8, c. 12.
234 See id art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
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Department of the Navy v. Egan23 to maximize presidential power.236 Egan,
however, is fundamentally a case of statutory construction. The case involved the
Navy's denial of a security clearance to Thomas Egan, who worked on the Trident
submarine.23 Egan subsequently was removed.23 He then sought review by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),239 but the Supreme Court upheld the
Navy's action by holding that the denial of a security clearance is a sensitive and
discretionary judgment call committed by law to the executive agency with the
necessary expertise for protecting classified information.24 The conflict in this case
was within the executive branch, between the Navy and the MSPB and not between
Congress and the executive branch.
The focus on statutory questions was evident throughout the case. As the Justice
Department noted in its brief submitted to the Supreme Court: "The issue in this case
is one of statutory construction and 'at bottom... turns on congressional intent.""'24
The parties were directed to address this question: "Whether, in the course of
reviewing the removal of an employee for failure to maintain a required security
clearance, the Merits Systems Protection Board is authorized by statute to review the
substance of the underlying decision to deny or revoke the security clearance." 242
The statutory questions concerned Sections 7512, 7513, 7532, and 7701 of title
5 of the United States Code. The Justice Department's brief analyzed the relevant
statutes and their legislative history and could find no basis for determining that
Congress intended the MSPB to review the merits of security clearance
determinations. 2 3 The entire oral argument.before the Court on December 2, 1987,
was devoted to the meaning of statutes and what Congress intended by them.244 At
no time did the Justice Department suggest that classified information could be
withheld from Congress.
The Court's deference to the Navy did not cast a shadow over the right of
Congress to sensitive information. The Court decided merely the "narrow question"
of whether the MSPB had statutory authority to review the substance of a decision
to deny a security clearance.245 Although the Court referred to independent
235 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
236 OLC Memo, supra note 161, at 6-7.
237 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 522.
238 See id
239 See id.
240 See id. at 529-30.
241 Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Egan (No. 86-1552) (quoting Clarke v. Securities
Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 (1987)).
242 Id. at (1) (emphasis added).
243 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit at 4-5, 13, 15-16, 18, Egan (No. 86-1552).
244 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Egan (No. 86-1552).
245 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 520.
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constitutional powers of the President, including those as Commander in Chief and
head of the executive branch,246 and noted the President's responsibility with regard
to foreign policy,247 the case was decided on statutory grounds. In stating that "courts
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
military and national security affairs,"24 the Court added this key qualification:
"unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise."'249 The Court appears to
have borrowed this thought and language from the Justice Department's brief:
"Absent an unambiguous grant ofjurisdiction by Congress, courts have traditionally
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the executive in military and national
security affairs."25 Nothing in the legislative history ofthe Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 convinced the Court that the MSPB could review, on the merits, an agency's
security-clearance determination.25" '
In citing the President's role as Commander in Chief, the Court stated that the
President's authority to protect classified information "flows primarily from this
constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any
explicit congressional grant." '252 If Congress had never enacted legislation regarding
classified information, certainly the President could act in the absence of
congressional authority. Yet, if Congress acts by statute, it can narrow the
President's range of action.
It is helpful to place Egan in the context of Justice Jackson's three categories laid
out in the Steel Seizure Cases of 1952:253 (1) when the President acts pursuant to
congressional authority, his authority is at its maximum because it includes
everything that he possesses under the Constitution, plus what Congress has delegated
to him;254 (2) when he acts in the absence of congressional authority, he operates in
a "zone of twilight" in which he and Congress share concurrent authority;2 . (3) when
he acts against "the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb." '256 Egan belongs in the middle category. The President's range is broad until
Congress enters the "zone of twilight" and exerts its own authority.
246 See id. at 527.
247 See id. at 529.
248 Id at 530.
" Id. (emphasis added).
250 Brief for the Petitioner at 21, Egan (No. 86-1552).
25 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531 n.6.
252 Id. at 527.
253 See Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
254 See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
256 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
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4. The Garfinkel Case
The OLC memorandum also misapprehended the litigation that led to the
Supreme Court's decision in American Foreign Service Ass 'n. v. Garfinkel.2" At
various points, the memorandum cites Garfinkel for the proposition that Congress
cannot "divest the President of his control over national security information in the
Executive Branch by vesting lower-ranking personnel in that Branch with a 'right'
to furnish such information to a Member of Congress without receiving official
authorization to do so."25 a Yet, the progression of this case from district court to the
Supreme Court and back to the district court illustrates how a lower court may
exaggerate the national security powers of the President at the expense of
congressional prerogatives. The district court's interpretation of executive power was
quickly vacated by the Supreme Court.
In 1983, President Reagan directed that all federal employees with access to
classified information sign "nondisclosure agreements" or risk the loss of their
security clearance.259 Congress, concerned about the vagueness of some terms and
the loss of access to information, passed legislation to prohibit the use of appropriated
funds to implement the nondisclosure policy.26°
In 1988, District Court Judge Oliver Gasch held that Congress lacked
constitutional authority to interfere by statute with nondisclosure agreements drafted
by the executive branch to protect the secrecy of classified information.26' Among
other authorities, Judge Gasch relied on Egan and Curtiss- Wright.262 From Egan he
extracted a sentence--"'The authority to protect such [national security] information
falls on the President as-head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in
Chief"" 263-without acknowledging that Egan was decided on statutory, not
constitutional, grounds. 2 4 From Curtiss- Wright, he concluded that the "sensitive and
complicated role cast for the President as this nation's emissary in foreign relations
requires that congressional intrusion upon the President's oversight of national
security information be more severely limited than might be required in matters of
257 490 U.S. 153 (1989).
258 OLC Memo, supra note 161, at 3.
259 See National Security Decision Directive 84; see also Louis Fisher, Congressional-
Executive Struggles Over Information Secrecy Pledges, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 89, 90 (1990).
260 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 630, 101 Stat. 1329-31,
1329-432; Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 100-440, § 619, 102 Stat. 1721, 1756.
261 See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 683
(D.D.C. 1988).
262 See id. at 676, 684-85.
263 Id. at 685 (quoting Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)).
264 See id
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purely domestic concern." 65 In fact, the issue in Curtiss-Wright was whether
Congress could delegate its powers to the President in the field of foreign relations.66
The previous year, the Court had struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act
because it delegated an excessive amount of legislative power to the President in the
field of domestic policy. 6 The question before the Court in Curtiss-Wright was
limited to whether Congress could use more general standards when delegating its
authority in foreign affairs. The Court held that more general standards were
permissible because of the changing circumstances that prevail in international
affairs.268 The issue before the Court was the extent to which Congress could
delegate its power (embargo authority), not the existence of independent and
autonomous powers for the President.
Having mischaracterized both Supreme Court decisions, Judge Gasch concluded
that Congress had passed legislation that "impermissibly restricts the President's
power to fulfill obligations imposed upon him by his express constitutional powers
and the role of the Executive in foreign relations.2 69
On October 31, 1988, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in the
Garfinkel case. 7 Both the House and the Senate submitted briefs objecting strongly
to Judge Gasch's analysis of the President's power over foreign affairs.27' During
oral argument, after Edwin Kneedler of the Justice Department spoke repeatedly
about the President's constitutional role to control classified information, one of the
justices remarked, "But, Mr. Kneedler, I just can't-I can't avoid interrupting you
with this thought. The Constitution also gives Congress the power to provide for a
navy and for the armed forces, and so forth, and often classified information is highly
relevant to their task. 272
On April 18, 1989, the Court issued a per curiam order that vacated Judge
Gasch's order and remanded the case for further consideration.273 In doing so, the
Court cautioned Judge Gasch to tread with greater caution in expounding upon
constitutional matters: "Having thus skirted the statutory question whether the
265 Id.
266 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
267 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
268 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
269 National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 685 (D.D.C.
1988).
270 See American Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 488 U.S. 923 (1988).
271 See Brief and Motion of the Speaker and Leadership Group for Leave to File Brief
Amici Curiae Out of Time, American Foreign Service Ass 'n (No. 87-2127); Motion for
Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of the United States Senate as
Amicus Curiae, American Foreign Service Ass 'n (No. 87-2127).
272 Transcript of Oral Argument at 57-58, Garfinkel (No. 87-2127).
273 See American Foreign Service Ass'n. v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (per curiam).
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Executive Branch's implementation of [nondisclosure] Forms 189 and 4193 violated
§ 630, the court proceeded to address appellees' argument that the lawsuit should be
dismissed because § 630 was an unconstitutional interference with the President's
authority to protect the national security.""' The Court emphasized that the district
court "should not pronounce upon the relative constitutional authority of Congress
and the Executive Branch unless it finds it imperative to do so. Particularly where,
as here, a case implicates the fundamental relationship between the Branches, courts
should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings. 275
On remand, Judge Gasch held that the plaintiffs (American Foreign Service
Association and members of Congress) failed to state a cause of action for courts to
decide.276 By dismissing the plaintiffs complaint on this ground, Judge Gasch did not
177address any of the constitutional issues.
C. Continued Executive-Legislative Collisions
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress and the executive branch clashed over access
to "national security" and "foreign affairs" documents. On each occasion, the Justice
Department insisted that these documents could not be shared with a congressional
committee. In the end, the administration was forced to drop its pretensions of having
an exclusive role in determining what to release. Federal courts applied the necessary
pressure in the first dispute. In the next two confrontations, the power of Congress
to hold an executive official in contempt was sufficient leverage to pry loose the
documents.
1. The AT&T Cases
The first dispute began in 1976 when Representative John Moss and his
subcommittee requested from the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (AT&T)
information on "national security" wiretaps by the administration." 8 AT&T was
willing to release the information, but the Justice Department intervened to prevent
compliance with the subcommittee subpoena, arguing that compliance might lead to
public disclosure of vital information injurious to national security. 79 President Ford
wrote directly to Representative Moss, "I have determined that compliance with the
subpoena would involve unacceptable risks of disclosure of extremely sensitive
274 Id. at 158.
25 Id. at 161.
276 American Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 732 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1990).
277 See id. at 16, 17.
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foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information and would be detrimental to
the national defense and foreign policy of the United States and damaging to the
national security."'28
A district court judge decided that if a final determination had to be made about
the need for secrecy and the risk of disclosure, "it should be made by the constituent
branch of government to which the primary role in these areas is entrusted. In the
areas of national security and foreign policy, that role is given to the Executive."28'
This judicial deference to presidential power was soon overturned by Judge
Harold Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit, who rejected the claim of the
Justice Department that the President "retains ultimate authority to decide what risks
to national security are acceptable. 2 2 In the opinion of the District of Columbia
Circuit, the cases cited by the administration did not "establish judicial deference to
executive determinations in the area of national security when the result of that
deference would be to impede Congress in exercising its legislative powers." '283
Leventhal urged executive and legislative officials to settle their differences out
of court, noting that a "compromise worked out between the branches is most likely
to meet their essential needs and the country's constitutional balance."2 Continued
disagreement between the Justice Department and the subcommittee forced the
appellate court to intervene again to give additional guidance.28 Leventhal dismissed
the idea that the dispute was primarily a "political question" beyond the court's
jurisdiction.8 6 When a dispute consists of a clash of authority between the two
branches, "judicial abstention does not lead to orderly resolution of the dispute, 287
for neither branch had "final authority in the area of concern. 288 In a dispute of this
nature,judicial intervention helps promote the "smooth functioning ofgovermment."2 9
Leventhal urged the parties to resolve their differences by seeking middle-ground
positions. He noted that the Framers, in adopting a Constitution with general and
overlapping provisions, anticipated that "a spirit of dynamic compromise would
promote resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and
effective functioning of our governmental system."2" Each branch "should take
cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation
through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular
280 Id. (quoting President Ford).
28, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 454, 461 (D.D.C. 1976).
2112 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
283 id.
214 Id. at 394.
21 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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fact situation."29' The case finally was dismissed on December 21, 1978, after the
Justice Department and the subcommittee settled their differences.292
2. Proceedings Against Henry Kissinger
On November 6, 1975, the House Select Committee on Intelligence issued a
subpoena to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, commanding him ,to provide
documents relating to covert actions.293 After he failed to comply with the subpoena,
the Committee met in open session to determine what action should be taken against
him. By a vote of 10 to 2, the Committee recommended that the Speaker certify, the
committee report regarding Kissinger's contumacious conduct and proceed to a
contempt citation. 2
94
Acting on the advice of the Justice Department, President Ford invoked executive
privilege on November 14 to keep the material from the committee. 29 He said that
the documents included "recommendations from previous Secretaries of State to
previous Presidents,"jeopardizing the internal decisionmaking process. 291 A few days
later, in a letter to the Committee, Ford cautioned that the dispute "involves grave
matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy and raises questions which go to the
ability of our Republic to govern itselfeffectively. '29" Recognizing that Congress had
constitutional responsibilities "to investigate fully matters relating to contemplated
legislation,"'2 9 FOrd told the Committee that he directed Kissinger not to comply with
the subpoena on the grounds of executive privilege because the documents "revealed
to an unacceptable degree the consultation process involving advice and
recommendations to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. ' a 9 Ford pointed out
that some of the documents concerned the National Security Council (NSC), and that,
as of November 3, Kissinger was no longer his Assistant for National Security
291 Id.
292 See HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG.
COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ACTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS, CURRENT TO
DECEMBER 31, 1978, at 50 (Comm. Print 1978).
293 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-693, at 4-5 (1975).
294 See id. at 2.
29" See The President's News Conference ofNovember 14, 1975, in 2 PUB. PAPERS 1866,
1867 (1975).
296 Id
297 Letter to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence About
Contempt Resolutions Concerning Testimony of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in 2
PUB. PAPERS 1887 (1975).
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1889.
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Affairs.3"° As to those materials, "there has been a substantial effort by the NSC
staff to provide these documents." 0'
Calling the contempt threat "frivolous," Kissinger warned that it would have
adverse effects worldwide: "'I profoundly regret that the committee saw fit to cite in
contempt a secretary of state, raising serious'questions all over the world what this
country is doing to itself."'' 2 On December 9, three committee members and two
staffmembers visited the White House to determine which documents would be made
available.3 3 The next day, they received an oral briefing on the information that had
been the target of the subpoena and an NSC aide read verbatim from documents
concerning the covert actions.3' On December 10, the committee chairman
announced that the White House was in "substantial compliance" with the subpoena
and that the planned contempt action was "moot.3OS
3. The James Watt Episode
The third dispute concerned a decision by Interior Secretary James Watt to
withhold thirty-one documents from a House subcommittee in 1981.306 The
confrontation quickly escalated to a committee subpoena for the documents and a
recommendation by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that Watt be
cited for contempt.307 When the full committee acted, the vote to hold Watt in
contempt was 23 to 19.31 s
Attorney General William French Smith advised President Reagan to invoke
executive privilege on the ground that "the interest of Congress in obtaining
information for oversight purposes is, I believe, considerable weaker than its interests
when specific legislative proposals are in question.''3°9 This was a remarkably
ineffective argument. Courts have held consistently that the investigative power is
available not merely to legislate or when a "potential" for legislating exists, but even
for pursuits down blind alleys.30 At the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason
30 See id. at 1889-90.
301 Id. at 1890..
302 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 406 (1975) (quoting Secretary of State Kissinger).
303 See id. at 407.
31 See id.
305 Id.
" See William Chapman, Hill Panel Votes to Cite Watt for Contempt, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 1982, at AI.
307 See id
308 See id.
309 STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: LEGAL OPINIONS REGARDING CLAIM OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN IN
RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA ISSUED TO JAMES G. WATT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 3
(Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE].
310 See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975).
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remarked that Congressmen "are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial
powers. They must meet frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices." ''
Moreover, Congress easily could erase Smith's'artificial distinction by introducing
a bill whenever it had oversight in mind.
Smith also claimed that all the documents at issue were "either necessary and
fundamental to the deliberative process presently ongoing in the Executive Branch or
relate to sensitive foreign policy considerations." '  Attorney General Smith's
comments about "foreign policy considerations" force one to wonder Whether the
Attorney General and his legal assistants in the Justice Department were unaware that
Congress had a clearly legitimate and constitutionally-based reason for requesting the
information. The dispute with Watt concerned the impact of Canadian investment
and energy policies on American commerce,3 13 an issue clearly within the enumerated
constitutional power of Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and
its authority to oversee the particular statute that established the nation's policy on
foreign investments. 4
The eventual outcome of this dispute demonstrated that the documents were not,
as Smith argued, of "fundamental" importance to the deliberative process. They
could have been, and eventually were, shared with the subcommittee. The White
House delivered the documents to a secure room on Capitol Hill and only
subcommittee members reviewed them.3" Conditions were imposed: the technical
assistance of subcommittee staff would not be available, and members could not316
photocopy the documents, but could take notes. Subcommittee members, however,
were granted access to the papers they wanted.
4. Immigration Cases
Newspaper stories in 1999 revealed the extent to which the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) relies on secret or classified evidence to take action
against aliens. In late 1999, an immigration judge ordered the release of an Egyptian
who had been kept in jail for three and a half years on grounds that the INS
considered him a national security threat.3 7 Classified FBI evidence linked him to
311 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES, supra note 167, at 206; see also id. at 199 (Mason's
comments, as recorded by Madison).
312 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 309, at 2.
313 See Chapman, supra note 306, at A5.
314 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
311 See H.R. REP. 97-898, at 8 (1982).
316 See id; Contempt of Congress: Hearings Before the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong. 385-94 (1982); Margot Homblower, White House Avoids Hill
Showdown Over Documents, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1982, at A5.
317 See Lorraine Adams and David A. Vise, INS Drops Plea to Reno to Detain Egyptian,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A5.
20001
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who had been convicted of conspiring to bomb the United
Nations. 31  The judge held that most of the evidence was "'double or triple
hearsay.' 319 INS Commissioner Doris Meissner "took the unusual step of citing
'national security implications' as a basis for asking [Attorney General Janet] Reno
to order that [the Egyptian] not be released."32 The previous month, a federal district
judge in New Jersey had ruled that "it was unconstitutional to detain a Palestinian
immigrant on the basis of secret evidence., 32' Representative David Bonior recently
introduced legislation to prohibit the use of classified evidence in deportation
proceedings.322 In approximately twenty pending immigration cases, the INS is
relying on secret evidence.323
D. Congressional Access to Executive Branch Employees
In 1997, the Select House and Senate Intelligence Committees considered
legislation to expand executive employee access to Congress. A Senate report
explained that current "executive branch policies on classified information could
interfere with [the Select Intelligence Committee's] ability to learn of wrongdoing
within the elements over which it has oversight responsibility."324 In creating the
Intelligence Committees in the 1970s, Congress relied heavily on them to guard the
interests of Congress as an institution.325 To a great degree, Congress delegated to
the committees the responsibility for monitoring and controlling the intelligence
community.
A memorandum of November 26, 1996, from the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC), an office within the Department of Justice, analyzed the constitutionality of
two congressional enactments concerning the rights of federal employees to provide
information to Congress:326 the Lloyd-LaFollette Act 27 and Section 625 of the
38 See id
3' Id (quoting Donn Livingston, an immigration judge).
320 Benjamin Weiser, US. Frees Man Jailed 3 Years on Secret Data, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1999, at Al.
32 Id. at B12.
322 See id.
323 See David Cole, Editorial, No More Secret Evidence, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at
A4 1.
324 S. REP. No. 105-24, at 26 (1997).
325 Senator Walter Huddleston, who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee,
remarked in 1980, "[T]he two broadly based Intelligence Committees will be acting as
proxies for the American people." 126 CONG. REC. 13095 (1980). Congressman Lee
Hamilton, as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, underscored that point in
1985: "The House and Senate Intelligence Committees provide the only check on
intelligence agencies outside the executive branch." 131 CONG. REC. 32436 (1985).
326 Memorandum from Christopher H. Schroeder, Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael
J. O'Neil, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Nov. 26, 1996 (on file with
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Treasury, Postal Service Appropriation Act for Fiscal 1997.328 Both statutory
provisions give executive employees the right to furnish information to either chamber
of Congress or to a committee or member thereof.
1. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act
The OLC memorandum swept broadly to challenge the constitutionality of the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, originally enacted in 1912.329 The statute responded to
presidential efforts to block the flow of information from executive employees to
Congress. For example, in 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a "gag order"
prohibiting executive branch employees from seeking to influence legislation
"individually or through associations," except through heads of departments. 330
Failure to abide by this presidential order resulted in possible dismissal from
government service.33' In 1909, President William Howard Taft issued another gag
order, forbidding any bureau chief or subordinate in government to apply to either
house of Congress, to any committee of Congress, orto any member of Congress, for
legislation, appropriations, or congressional action of any kind,
except with the consent and knowledge of the head of the department; nor
shall any such person respond to any request for information from either
House of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, or any
Member of Congress, except through, or as authorized by, the head of his
department.332
Through language added to an appropriations bill in 1912, Congress nullified the
gag orders issued by Roosevelt and Taft. 333 The debate on this provision underscored
Congress' concern that the gag orders would put congressional committees in the
position of hearing only "one side of a case": the views of Cabinet officials rather
than the rank-and-file employees of a department.334 Members wanted agency
employees to express complaints about the conduct of their supervisors.335 The stated
purpose of the legislation was to ensure that government employees could exercise
author).
327 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1994).
328 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-359 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994)).
329 See 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912).
330 48 CONG. REc. 4513 (1912).
331 See id
332 Id.
331 See 37 Stat. 539 (1912).
134 48 CONG. REC. at 4657 (1912).
335 See id.
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their constitutional rights to free speech, to peaceable assembly, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances.336
Lawmakers viewed the gag orders as an effort "to prevent the Congress from
learning the actual conditions that surrounded the employees of the service. '337 If
agency employees could speak only through the heads of departments, "there is no
possible way of obtaining information excepting through the Cabinet officers, and if
these officials desire to withhold information and suppress the truth orto conceal their
official acts it is within their power to do so., 338 Another legislator remarked, "The
vast army of Government employees have signed no agreement upon entering the
service of the Government to give up the boasted liberty of the American citizens. '
Even more explicit was the following statement delivered during a debate in the
Senate:
Mr. President, it will not do for Congress to permit the executive branch
of this Government to deny to it the sources of information which ought
to be free and open to it, and such an order as this, it seems to me, belongs
in some other country than the United States.34 '
Section 6 of the Postal Services Appropriations Act of 1912 added the language
used to nullify the gag orders.34' Section 6, known as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,
provided a number of procedural safeguards to protect agency officials from arbitrary
dismissals. The final sentence of Section 6 reads: "The right of persons employed
in the civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition
Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of
Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered
with. 342
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 later supplemented Section 6 and codified
it as permanent law. 3 The conference report elaborated on the need for executive
employees to disclose information to Congress:
The provision is intended to make clear that by placing limitations on the
kinds of information any employee may publicly disclose without
suffering reprisal, there is no intent to limit the information an employee
336 See id. at 5201.
317 Id. at 5235.
... Id. at 5634 (statement of Rep. Lloyd).
311 Id. at 5637 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
340 Id. at 10674 (statement of Sen. Reed).
341 See 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912).
342 Id
343 See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1994).
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may provide to Congress or to authorize reprisal against an employee for
providing information to Congress. For example, 18 U.S.C. 1905
.prohibits public disclosure of information involving trade secrets. That
statute does not apply to transmittal of such information by an agency to
Congress. Section 2302(b)(8) of this act would not protect an employee
against reprisal for public disclosure of such statutorily protected
information, but it is not to be inferred that an employee is similarly
unprotected if such disclosure is made to the appropriate unit of the
Congress. Neither title I nor any other provision of the act should be
construed as limiting in any way the rights of employees to communicate
with or testify before Congress.3"
As codified in 1978, any interference with the right of executive branch
employees in communicating with Congress becomes an enforceable right along with
other prohibited personnel practices. The United States Code now provides that
various qualifications to the provision on prohibited personnel practices "shall not be
construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress or the taking
of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to the
Congress. 345
2. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
Congress supplemented these federal employee protections by enacting legislation
in 1989, finding that "[flederal employees who make disclosures described in section
2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, serve the public interest by assisting in the
elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, and unnecessary Government expenditures"3" and
that "protecting employees who disclose Government illegality, waste, and corruption
is a major step toward a more effective civil service., 34' Employees may disclose
information that they reasonably believe evidences a violation of any law, rule, or
regulation, or constitutes gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.34 Such
disclosures are permitted unless "specifically prohibited by law and if such
information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs., 349 In signing the bill,
President George Bush said that "a true whistleblower is a public servant of the
344 S. REP. No. 95-1272, 132 (1978).
34' 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1994).
346 Pub. L. 101-12 § 2(a)(l), 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
14I Id. § 2(a)(2).
348 See id § 1213(a)(1).
349 Id.
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highest order. ... [T]hese dedicated men and women should not be fired or rebuked
or suffer financially for their honesty and good judgment. 35 °
3. Congressional Action in 1998
In order to examine the objections raised by the OLC, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence held two days of hearings in 1998."s' Professor Peter
Raven-Hansen of the George Washington University Law School and I appeared the
first day to rebut the OLC's position that the President has ultimate and unimpeded
authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination of national security
information.? 2 On the second day of hearings, I testified alongside an attorney from
the OLC.353
Based on these hearings and its own independent staff analysis, the Committee
reported legislation despite claims by the Justice Department that the bill was an
unconstitutional invasion of presidential prerogatives .34 The Committee acted
unanimously, voting 19 to 0 to report the measure. 3" The bipartisan vote for
legislative prerogatives was solid. The Senate report said that the "Administration's
intransigence on this issue compelled the Committee to act."316 The bill passed the
Senate by a vote of 93 to 1.317
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence took a different approach
in drafting the legislation, but also rejected the Administration's claim that the
President exercised exclusive control over national security information. I testified
before the House Committee as well. 3"8 Like the Senate, the House Committee
dismissed the assertion that the President, as Commander in Chief, "has ultimate and
unimpeded constitutional authority over national security, or classified, information.
Rather, national security is a constitutional responsibility shared by the executive and
legislative branches that proceeds according to the principles and practices of
comity. '3M The two committees reported and enacted legislation with this language:
350 Remarks on Signing the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, in I PUB. PAPERS 391
(1989).
' See Disclosure of Classified Information to Congress, 1988: Hearings Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998).
352 See id. at 13-39.
... See id. at 45.
114 See S. REP. NO. 105-165 (1998).
... See id, at 2.
356 Id. at 5.
317 See 144 CONG. REC. at S1564 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1998).
3s1 See Record ofProceedings on H.R. 3829, The Intelligence Community Whistleblower
Protection Act: Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
106th Cong. 32-53 (1998).
319 H.R. REP. No. 105-747, pt.I, at 15 (1998).
[Vol. 8:3
INVOKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
"4national security is a shared responsibility, requiring joint efforts and mutual respect
by Congress and the President.""'3 ' The statute further provided that "Congress, as
a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as a
check on the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a 'need to know' of allegations
of wrongdoing within the executive branch, including allegations of wrongdoing in
the Intelligence Community."36
CONCLUSION
To perform its constitutional functions, Congress depends on information
obtained from the executive branch. The Supreme Court remarked in 1927:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse must be
had to those who do possess it.362
Investigation is a prerequisite for intelligent lawmaking, and much of the
information that Congress requires is located within the executive branch. Congress
needs information to enact legislation, to oversee the administration of programs, to
inform the public, and to protect its integrity, dignity, reputation, and privileges. To
enforce these constitutional duties, Congress possesses the inherent power to issue
subpoenas and to punish for contempt.363 The Supreme Court has said that the power
of Congress to conduct investigations "comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 364
The power of Congress to investigate reaches all sectors of executive branch
activity, not merely domestic policy, but also foreign, military, and national security
policy. The first major congressional investigation, in 1792, involved the ill-fated
expedition of Major General St. Clair.36' To buttress its power to investigate,
Congress frequently enacts statutory language that requires the executive branch to
produce information. When Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act of
31 Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 701(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2413 (1998).
361 Id. § 701(b)(3); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-780, at 19 (1998).
362 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
363 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975);
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 207 (1821).
31 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
365 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490 (1792).
" See supra Pt. III.
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192 1,367 it directed the newly established Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of
Management and Budget) to provide Congress with information: "The Bureau shall,
at the request of any committee of either House of Congress having jurisdiction over
revenue or appropriations, furnish the committee such aid and information as-it may
request."36 The current version regarding congressional requests for information in
the budget area appears in title 31 of the United States Code.3 69
As part of the National Security Act, Congress, in 1991, required the "Director
of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities
of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities" to "keep the
intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other
than a covert action."37° The procedures for covert actions are spelled out elsewhere.
The intelligence committees are to receive "any information or material concerning
intelligence activities... which is requested by either of the intelligence committees
in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities."37'
Congress also relies on the assistance of employees within the executive branch.
Upon the request of a congressional committee or a committee member, any officer
or employee of the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for
International Development, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
or any other department, agency, or independent establishment of the
United States Government primarily concerned with matters relating to
foreign countries or multilateral organizations may express his views and
opinions, and make recommendations he considers appropriate, if the
request of the committee or member of the committee relates to a subject
which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.372
The text and intent of the Constitution, combined with legislative and judicial
precedents over the past two centuries, provide strong support for congressional
access to information within the executive branch. Without that information,
Congress would be unable adequately to discharge its legislative and constitutional
duties. It could not properly oversee executive branch agencies, which are creatures
of Congress. Part of legislative access depends on executive employees-the rank-
367 Pub. L. 67-13, 42 Stat..20 (1921).
363 Id. § 212.
369 See 31 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994).
370 Pub. L. 102-88 § 502, 105 Stat. 442 (1991).
37' 50 U.S.C. § 413a (1994), as added by the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub.
L. 102-88, 105 Stat. 442 (1991); STAFF OF HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, 104TH CONG., COMPILATION OF INTELLIGENCE LAWS AND RELATED LAWS
AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF INTEREST TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 20
(Comm. Print 1995).
372 2 U.S.C. § 194(a) (1994).
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and-file-who are willing to share with Congress information about operations within
their agencies. On the basis of two centuries of experience, Congress knows the value
of gaining access to information regarding agency corruption and mismanagement
that an administration may want to conceal.
No doubt the executive branch has an interest in seeing that agency information
is disclosed only through authorized channels. Part of that concern has been directed
toward controlling information that might be embarrassing to the agency, and the
administration, if released. There is no legal or constitutional justification for
concealing that kind of information. To the extent that the concern of the executive
branch is directed toward the control of information that might be damaging to
national security, the intelligence committees have procedures in place designed to
protect against such damage. To question these procedures would put the executive
branch in the position of asserting that only its procedures can safely protect national
security, even at the cost of denying Congress the information it needs to discharge
its constitutional duties.
